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Government Regulation and 
Changes in the Affordable 
Housing Stock
1.I n t r o d u c t i o n
n terms of housing issues, the primary public policy focus of 
economists has been the affordability of homes, mortgage 
availability, land-use regulation, and rent control. Studies of 
land-use regulation focus on the effects of regulation on the 
price of owner-occupied housing. Work on low-income 
housing has concerned itself more with issues of measurement 
and the debate over supply-side versus demand-side subsidies. 
In this paper, we look at the relationship between these two 
issues to examine how government regulation affects the 
dynamics of the low-income housing stock. We find that, 
consistent with theoretical models of housing, restrictions on 
the supply of new units lower the supply of affordable units. 
This occurs because increases in the demand for higher quality 
units raise the returns to maintenance, repairs, and renovations 
of lower quality units, as landlords have a stronger incentive to 
upgrade them to a higher quality, higher return housing 
submarket. This result is disturbing because it highlights how 
policies targeted toward new, higher income owner-occupied 
suburban housing can have unintended negative consequences 
for lower income renters.
Our research differs from most studies of affordable 
housing in that we are not concerned with identifying the size 
of the affordable stock or matching it to the number of low-
income households. The gap between the housing needs of 
low-income households and the stock of units deemed 
affordable has been demonstrated in a considerable amount of 
other research.1 Here, we build on the Somerville and Holmes 
(2001) study of the effects of the unit, neighborhood, and 
market characteristics on the probability that a unit will stay in 
the stock of rental units affordable to low-income households; 
we do so by looking at how government regulations affect this 
probability. Our approach is to look at individual units in 
successive waves of the American Housing Survey (AHS) 
metropolitan area sample. In doing so, we follow Nelson and 
Vandenbroucke (1996) and Somerville and Holmes (2001), 
who use the panel nature of the AHS metropolitan area survey 
data to chart the movements of individual units in and out of 
the low-income housing stock.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. First, we 
lay out the theoretical framework for our analysis. We follow with 
a discussion of our data. Finally, we present our empirical results, 
both for measures of constraints on the supply of new residential 
units and for the pervasiveness of rent control in an area.
2. Theoretical Framework
We model movements of units in and out of the stock of 
affordable housing as the filtering down of units through 
successive housing submarkets. The filtering model describes 
the housing market as a series of submarkets differentiated by 
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unit quality. Rents fall as quality declines, so units that are 
lower on the quality ladder have lower rents than units of the 
same size in the same location at the top. Without expenditures 
on maintenance, renovation, and repairs, units decline in 
quality as they depreciate physically and technologically. As 
this occurs, the units move down the quality ladder. The cost to 
maintain a given level of quality is assumed to increase with 
unit age. Extra expenditures on maintenance and renovation 
can move units back up the ladder. Relative rents in the 
different submarkets vary with the distribution of income 
across households (demand) and the supply of units in that 
submarket. When quality is least expensive to provide at the 
time units are built, new units will be of high quality. The 
supply of the most affordable, lowest quality units will be those 
units built in earlier periods that have been allowed to 
depreciate and move down—to filter down—the quality 
ladder. Landlords will choose a level of maintenance to 
maximize profits, and that choice determines into which 
housing submarket their unit will fall. When incomes, 
population, and the housing stock raise rents in the submarket 
for higher quality units relative to those in the submarket for 
lower quality units, landlords in the latter submarket have a 
greater incentive to increase maintenance, renovation, and 
repair expenditures to cause units to filter up, that is, to move 
to the higher quality submarket. Reducing the supply of low-
end affordable units can potentially exacerbate affordability 
problems for the least well-off. Although this may occur when 
the entire demand curve for a neighborhood’s amenities shifts 
out, we do not formally model neighborhood gentrification, 
focusing instead on unit-specific decisions.
The focus of this paper is on use of the filtering model to 
explain the effect of restrictions on new construction and rent 
control on the movement in units in and out of the low-income 
housing stock. We expect that factors that lower the market’s 
new-construction-supply response to increases in demand will 
reduce the affordable housing stock. This occurs because the 
increase in demand that is unmet with new construction raises 
the returns to landlords for moving units up the quality ladder. 
These factors can include explicit government land-use 
regulations that constrain the new supply or an area’s market 
supply elasticity, which for reasons such as unobserved 
regulation, land supply, and builder industry organization can 
differ across markets.
One of the major forms of government regulation of housing 
markets with important implications for the affordable housing 
stock is rent control. The question of interest for this paper is 
what effect rent control has on the uncontrolled affordable 
housing stock. We know from Early and Phelps (1999) and Fallis 
and Smith (1984) that rent control lowers the supply of 
uncontrolled affordable housing because excess demand for 
units raises rents in this segment. This suggests that it raises the 
probability that in any time period the uncontrolled units that 
remain affordable will be more likely to filter up. Alternatively, 
there may be reasons why these units remain affordable and 
cannot filter up easily. The units could be of particularly low 
quality or there may be negative neighborhood effects from 
surrounding, poorly maintained rent-controlled buildings. 
Finally, an application of the labor markets’ efficiency wage 
model suggests that some landlords who prefer to keep rents low 
to give themselves the advantage of selecting from a larger pool 
of prospective tenants increase their ability to weed out those 
who may be more likely to be bad tenants.
3.T h e  E x i s t i n g  L i t e r a t u r e
This paper draws from a wide variety of existing work. There is a 
literature on filtering stretching back to Ratcliff ’s (1949) 
discussion of the phenomenon. Government land-use regulation 
as it applies to new construction has spawned a voluminous 
theoretical and empirical literature looking at zoning restrictions 
on use and density, development fees, greenbelts, growth 
controls, and factors that delay and slow the new supply response 
to demand shocks. Furthermore, in an area where economists 
mostly agree with one another, there is a copious literature on 
rent control and its effect on rents, maintenance, and housing 
market equilibria. All of this work bears on our paper.
Sweeney (1974) is credited with the first thorough theoretical 
treatment of filtering, where the level of maintenance affects the 
rate of depreciation. The theoretical literature includes papers 
that expand his model to include other issues.2 Most of the 
recent empirical filtering literature does not examine individual 
units directly, but looks for outcomes consistent with filtering. 
Phillips (1981) uses cross-sectional data to compare mean 
neighborhood income with descriptive statistics of the 
neighborhood housing stock. Weicher and Thibodeau (1988), 
using aggregate data, test for the effect of new construction on 
the low-income housing stock. A more targeted study is Susin’s 
(1999) examination of the effect of Section 8 housing vouchers 
on rents for the least expensive third of units. Using the AHS 
neighborhood sample, he finds a fairly inelastic supply curve and 
little downward filtering as rents are clearly higher in the 
presence of vouchers. The notable exception to these studies 
with aggregate data is Somerville and Holmes (2001). They use 
micro data to describe the relationship between individual unit, 
neighborhood, and market characteristics, and the probability 
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Here, we look at the effect of land-use regulations on filtering. 
Although no work has done this explicitly, a considerable body 
of research has studied the theoretical and empirical effects of 
various land-use regulations on urban form, development 
patterns, and the price of housing. Nearly all of the existing 
empirical work (see Fischel [1990] for a review) explores the 
impact of regulation on house prices, with the bulk of the papers 
finding that increased local regulation leads to higher house 
prices. Constraints on supply result in higher house prices, but so 
too does the capitalization of benefits that regulations provide 
for local residents. A much smaller literature looks specifically 
for the effects of regulation on new construction, and finds lower 
levels of construction in the presence of higher regulatory 
barriers and fees.3 This latter literature is relevant for our analysis 
because we expect that restrictions on new development will 
affect the supply of affordable units from the existing stock by 
creating excess demand in the market for newer and higher 
quality units, which increases the incentives for landlords to 
upgrade their units.
We also examine the relationship between rent control and 
filtering. There is a copious literature that highlights aspects of 
the aggregate welfare losses associated with rent control.4 Olsen 
(1998) provides a brief of summary of the economics of rent 
control; other important work is Glaeser (1996) and Glaeser 
and Luttmer (1997) on the welfare losses from the mis-
allocation of housing under rent control, and the seminal 
empirical analysis by Olsen (1972).
4.D a t a  D e s c r i p t i o n
We use the AHS metropolitan surveys to create a data set of 
individual rental units in metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) 
from 1984 to 1994 for those MSAs for which we have land-use 
regulation data. An “observation” is an individual rental unit 
that is included in two successive surveys. Each MSA is 
surveyed every three or four years in waves of approximately 
eleven MSAs per survey, so that we have potentially two 
observations per unit for twenty-three of the MSAs and one 
observation per unit for the remaining twenty-one. As a result, 
our time periods of analysis are not constant across MSAs. 
However, our right-hand-side variables are either survey-
period-specific or assumed to be time-invariant within an 
MSA. Observations per unit are constrained by the 
introduction of a new survey questionnaire in 1984 and a new 
sample in 1995.5 When examining rent control, we look only at 
those MSAs that include jurisdictions that impose significant 
rent control.
In this paper, we define the affordable housing stock as those 
units for which the gross rents are less than or equal to 30 per-
cent of household income for a household with 35 percent of 
the median MSA household income. We map this cutoff to 
different unit sizes using the Department of Housing and 
Urban Development’s methodology for calculating differences 
in fair market rents by unit size.6 Throughout, we use rent to 
refer to gross rents.7 Although there are a variety of approaches 
to defining affordability, we have a taken a naïve approach. We 
do not believe that how we define the housing stock should 
cause problems. Our test is of the effect of a vector of variables 
on the probability that a unit will cross a threshold, relative to 
not doing so. How we define the threshold only matters if the 
effect of explanatory variables varies systematically along the 
quality ladder.
This study analyzes how restrictions on new construction 
and rent control affect the evolution of the affordable stock. 
Units must appear in at least two surveys to be included in our 
sample. As a result, we exclude units that for whatever reason 
appear in only one survey. A unit identified as affordable in the 
first survey year can have one of four outcomes in the 
subsequent survey year, assuming that the occupants respond 
to the second survey. First, it can remain affordable. Second, 
the unit’s rent can exceed the affordability cutoff, that is, filter 
up. Third, a unit can become owner-occupied. Fourth, it can 
either be abandoned, or demolished or converted.8 For rental 
units that were identified as unaffordable in the first survey 
year, we have a similar set of possible outcomes, except that the 
baseline remains unaffordable and option two is to filter down 
and become affordable.
We employ a mixed strategy to private-market units where 
the occupant receives a subsidy. Work by McArdle (n.d.) 
indicates that in many cases in the AHS, one cannot distinguish 
between the actual gross rent and the gross rent paid (net of the 
subsidy). We choose to exclude units where the occupant 
receives a subsidy in the first survey year. However, a unit 
whose occupying household did not receive a subsidy in the 
first survey, but did in the second survey, is considered to be 
affordable in the second survey. This approach does not result 
in bias, as treating subsidized units as a separate category into 
which units can move does not qualitatively change our results.
Table 1 shows the frequency of each outcome for 
movements out of the affordable housing stock and out of the 
unaffordable stock between any two AHS metropolitan 
surveys. Similar to Nelson and Vandenbroucke (1996), we find 
substantial movement in and out of the affordable stock. Not 
surprisingly, units in the unaffordable stock are less likely to 
become government-subsidized or be demolished, but are 
more likely to convert to owner-occupancy than are units 
initially classified as affordable. These figures show an increase 48 Government Regulation and Changes
of approximately 1,700 units. This result may be misleading 
because the AHS will tend to exclude units with a change in 
occupants in successive surveys; this leads to bias because these 
are the units most likely to experience rent increases.9
In Table 2, we present the distribution of rent-controlled 
units for those MSAs with rent-control policies. The number of 
rental units subject to rent control varies widely, from a low of 
4 percent in Boston to a high of more than 25 percent in San 
Francisco. The principal determinant appears to be whether the 
central city itself imposes rent control. Even in cities with little 
rent control, there is at least one zone for which rent-controlled 
units make up more than 10 percent of the rental stock.
In the analysis, we include unit and neighborhood variables 
that enter into the landlord’s optimal maintenance and 
renovation decision as well as the MSA land-use and supply 
restriction variables. All regressions also include a set of control 
variables. We include unit characteristics such as a dummy 
variable for the unit if it is defined as adequate by AHS 
standards, unit age, a dummy for multiunit buildings, and the 
number of units in the structure. Adequacy is an AHS-coded 
summary variable based on responses to questions about 
physical problems in the unit. The lack of hot piped water or a 
flush toilet would classify a unit as severely inadequate, while 
multiple leaks and holes in the floor and walls would classify 
the unit as moderately inadequate.
Neighborhood effects enter the decision to invest in a unit’s 
quality. We use AHS zones—socioeconomically homogeneous 
areas of approximately 100,000 people—as our definition of a 
neighborhood. Although larger than a neighborhood, this is the 
most geographically disaggregated variable available in the AHS 
metropolitan survey. For each zone, we estimate the ratio of 
rental units to all units, affordable units to all rental units, public 
housing units to all rental units, and subsidized units to all rental 
units in the zone. We also measure the average age of the rental 
stock, the percentage of households headed by an African-
American, and the median household income in the zone.
Both market and unit measures act as control variables. The 
first controls for the effect of aggregate MSA changes in house 
prices and rents in causing movements of individual units into 
and out of the affordable stock. We use DiPasquale and 
Somerville’s (1995) methodology to generate hedonic price 
Table 1
Changes in the Affordable Housing Stock
Number Percentage
Units beginning as affordable
Remain affordable 4,171 45.3
Become unaffordable 2,928 31.8
Become subsidized 760 8.3
Become owner-occupied 506 5.5
Are demolished or converted 837 9.1
Total 9,202
Units beginning as unaffordable
Remain unaffordable 54,298 78.1
Become affordable 6,007 8.6
Become subsidized 3,185 4.6
Become owner-occupied 4,703 6.8
Are demolished or converted 1,369 2.0
Total 69,562
Notes: Only units that had observations for two consecutive years are 
included; units that were initially government subsidized or classified as 
public housing are excluded. A unit is defined as affordable if the sum of 
rent and utilities is less than 30 percent of household income for a house-
hold at 35 percent of the median income for four-person families for that 
year in that city. To account for different unit sizes, we make an adjust-
ment based on the number of bedrooms. These aggregate data are likely 
to underestimate the number of units that become unaffordable because 
rents tend to increase more when tenants change, but new tenants are less 
likely to become American Housing Survey respondents.
Table 2
Rent-Control Descriptive Statistics
Percentage of Rent-Controlled Units in Rental Stock
Percentage of Rent-Controlled Rental Units in Zone
Metropolitan Statistical  Area (MSA)
MSA Mean 
(Percent)












Boston 4.0 31 2.3 0.0 0.0 1.8 5.7 
Los Angeles 25.0 44 19.2 2.1 8.0 39.0 47.9 
New York 17.1 83 11.6 0.0 9.3 18.0 28.7 
San Francisco 25.5 22 17.6 0.9 4.2 36.1 56.4 
San Jose 10.1 10 9.2 5.5 6.9 12.7 16.5 
Washington, D.C. 9.3 23 6.6 0.8 2.0 4.1 25.9 FRBNY Economic Policy Review / June 2003 49
and rent series from the AHS, with mean values of the 
affordable stock used to describe the bundle. The second is the 
ratio of a unit’s rent to the affordability conditions that the 
most marginally affordable units are more likely to filter up.
Data on land-use regulation come from the Wharton Urban 
Decentralization Project Data Set (Linneman and Summers 
1991). These data summarize surveys sent to local planners in a 
sample of sixty MSAs, of which we have price data and American 
Housing Survey information for thirty-eight. We include two 
measures of regulation, a count of the number of ways in which 
growth management techniques have been introduced in the 
MSA, and whether development or impact fees are imposed in 
the cities in the MSA. The number of growth management 
techniques is the sum of five different dummy variables, each of 
which indicates whether one of the following approaches to 
introducing growth management policies is prevalent in the 
MSA: citizen referendum; legislative action by municipalities, 
counties, and the state; and administrative action by public 
authorities. We assume that the more types of actions taken and 
the greater the number of groups that act to control 
development, the more constrained the regulatory environment. 
These variables vary by MSA, but are constant over time. This 
forces us to assume that the regulatory environment described by 
these variables is time-invariant.
In Table 3, we present descriptive statistics for these 
variables separately for affordable units and unaffordable units. 
Comparing these two sets, we note that the difference of means 
t-tests rejects equality of means for nearly all variables. 
Table 3
Descriptive Statistics






t-Test on Mean 
Difference
Unit
Adequacy of unit (1 if adequate, 0 otherwise) 9,202 0.72 0.45 69,562 0.90 0.30 37.44
Age of unit 9,202 46.56 19.58 69,562 27.91 20.64 85.33
Unit is part of multiunit building (1 if yes, 0 if no) 9,202 0.70 0.46 69,562 0.76 0.43 12.43
Number of units in building 9,202 8.35 19.00 69,562 13.63 29.19 23.25
Neighborhood
Ratio of subsidized units to rental units in zone 9,202 0.11 0.06 69,562 0.10 0.06 19.52
Average age of rental units in zone 9,202 37.15 13.67 69,562 28.28 12.92 58.85
Ratio of public housing units to rental units in zone 9,202 0.07 0.07 69,562 0.04 0.05 39.15
Ratio of rental units to all units in zone 9,202 0.48 0.17 69,562 0.44 0.15 21.53
Ratio of affordable units to rental units in zone 9,202 0.31 0.17 69,562 0.14 0.13 92.42
Percentage African-American heads of household in zone 9,202 0.27 0.30 69,562 0.13 0.18 44.67
Median household income in zone 9,202 21,487 8,665 69,562 27,650 8,998 63.83
Regulation
New single-family permits—supply elasticity 7,502 15.96 8.64 56,552 14.37 7.38 15.25
Jurisdictions in MSA use impact fees (dummy) 8,571 0.36 0.48 61,708 0.51 0.50 27.35
Number of approaches to growth management 8,215 0.54 0.83 59,713 0.69 0.89 14.66
Percentage rent control in zone greater than 10 percent (1 if yes, 0 if no) 761 0.47 0.50 8,302 0.30 0.46 9.04
Percentage rent control in zone 761 0.14 0.16 8,302 0.10 0.14 6.67
Control
Hedonic price change in MSA (affordable units) 9,202 0.07 0.38 69,562 0.08 0.34 1.95
Hedonic rent change in MSA (affordable units) 9,202 0.23 0.11 69,562 0.21 0.12 19.54
Number of years current resident has occupied unit 7,878 6.33 8.60 60,907 2.92 4.96 34.39
Ratio of rent to cutoff of affordability 9,202 0.76 0.20 69,562 1.62 0.46 319.24
Notes: Only units that were included in two consecutive surveys are included; units that dropped out of the sample in successive surveys are excluded. All 
price and rent changes are measured in nominal dollars. The mean values in the affordable units column and the unaffordable units column for the hedonic 
price and rent changes differ because these two categories of units are not distributed identically across metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs). Rent-control 
variables are only for Boston, Los Angeles, Newark, San Francisco, San Jose, and Washington, D.C., American Housing Surveys. Supply elasticities and
regulation variables are only available for thirty-eight of forty-four American Housing Survey MSAs.50 Government Regulation and Changes
Qualitatively, affordable units are in poorer condition and in 
older and smaller buildings. Tenants have a notably longer 
mean stay in the affordable units, 6.3 versus 2.9 years. 
Affordable units are both more concentrated in space than are 
rental units in general and are much more likely to be in areas 
with a higher proportion of African-Americans. Although 
other differences are statistically significant, they are not 
meaningful. The rent changes, which are calculated at the zone 
rather than at the unit level, differ by class because affordable 
and nonaffordable units do not have the same distribution 
across space, while price and rent changes vary by area. Those 
MSAs with more affordable units are likely to have higher 
supply elasticities and less land-use regulation.
5. Empirical Results
We estimate the model using a multinomial logit specification 
where any observation   to n can fall into one of k groups. 
For a unit currently in the low-income stock, these groups are 
remaining in the low-income stock, filtering up (defined as 
having a rent that surpasses the affordability threshold), 
converting to owner-occupied, or being demolished. For each 
observation, we have a probability:
(1) for all k = 1 to 4 groups.
Equation 1 is unidentified unless we set  . The 
standard procedure is to present the odds ratio, the ratio of the 
probability that   relative to the probability that 
. For instance:
(2) .
The multinomial regression results are presented in the 
appendix. There, Tables A1 and A2 show the effects of land-use 
regulation on affordable and unaffordable units, while Table A3 
does the same for the effect of the rent-control variables. The 
relatively small number of degrees of freedom at the MSA level 
causes us to separate these two into distinct tables.
Multinomial logit regression output can be difficult to 
interpret. The coefficients are both exponentiated and relative 
to the baseline outcome, which, in our case, is when the unit’s 
affordability status remains unchanged. We present the results 
in a set of tables that show the sensitivity of relative 
probabilities to given changes in the values of right-hand-side 
variables. These describe the percentage-point change in the 
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probability of outcome i, relative to remaining affordable, for a 
10 percent change in the explanatory variables. These results 
are like elasticities, but are applied to relative rather than to 
absolute probabilities.
Table 4 shows the effects of the unit characteristics, 
neighborhood quality measures, and control variables. Adding 
the government regulation variables to these variables does not 
change the results, so for clarity of presentation, we show them 
just once. The results in column 1 describe the sensitivity that an 
affordable unit filters up, relative to staying affordable. Several 
factors stand out. Older units are less likely to filter up, as the cost 
of improving quality is higher. Neighborhood effects matter: 
filtering up is more likely to occur in neighborhoods with lots of 
rental units, but less likely if those units are mostly affordable. 
The control variables matter: units are more likely to become 
unaffordable if rents are rising in the market and if the unit’s 
initial survey rent is closer to the cutoff. Being in better shape 
relative to the neighborhood also matters. From columns 2 and 
3, the older the zone average, controlling for the unit’s own age, 
the more likely the unit is to become owner-occupied, and the 
less likely it is to be demolished, though conversion to owner-
occupancy is falling and demolition or conversion is rising in the 
unit’s own age. For units initially unaffordable—columns 3-6—
median zone income and market conditions are extremely 
important. Units are dramatically less likely to filter down or be 
demolished/converted the higher the median zone income is and 
the greater the increase in rents is.
Table 5 presents the effects of changes in regulation 
measures on changes in the stock of affordable units. All of the 
regression specifications used in Table 5 include the full set of 
unit, neighborhood, and control variables in Table 4. The 
results here are consistent with the filtering model: the more 
constrained the supply response for new residential units to 
demand shocks, the greater the probability that an affordable 
unit will filter up and out of the affordable stock relative to 
staying in the stock. Explicitly, the greater the supply elasticity 
of new single-family construction, the lower this relative 
probability will be, as builders are able to respond much more 
quickly to demand shocks. With more units coming in more 
quickly in response to an increase in demand, relative rents 
between high- and low-quality markets diverge less, reducing 
the returns to upgrading a unit so that it can filter up. The sign 
is robust across specifications, though the coefficient is not 
uniformly statistically different from zero. We find this a 
compelling result, clearly identifying the linkage between 
construction of new high- and standard-quality homes and the 
affordable stock consisting of lower quality units.
In regressions 2 and 3, we add the two measures of 
government land-use regulation, the presence of impact fees, 
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techniques used in the MSA. We argue that both describe 
constraints on supply. In both cases, greater regulation results 
in an increase in the probability that an affordable rental unit 
will filter up to become unaffordable. This is consistent with 
the predictions of the filtering model, as the constraints on new 
development can be expected to increase the returns to 
maintenance and renovation because with less new 
construction, relative rents for units of higher quality will be 
greater. The effects of elasticity and regulation variables on the 
relative probability of conversion to owner-occupied status or 
being demolished or converted are not statistically different 
from their effect on a unit remaining affordable.
We believe that the negative effect of supply regulations is 
more pronounced than is suggested by the absolute magnitude 
of these coefficients. When we compare the quasi-elasticities in 
Table 5 with those in Table 4, 10 percent increases in each of the 
elasticity and regulations variables have no more than one-
quarter the effect of a similar increase in unit age and less than 
half the effect for unit quality. The effect is also less than one-
quarter that of the neighborhood measures, mix of rental, 
owner-occupied, and affordable units in the zone. However, to 
say that the effects of regulations are unimportant would be 
erroneous. Our regulation measures are quite crude, yet they 
still provide robust, theoretically compelling results. More 
important, an increase in these measures affects all units in the 
affordable stock, so that even with a small effect per unit, the 
aggregate effect on affordable housing can be substantive. In 
contrast, unit age or quality affects the unit alone.
In Table 6, we present the same results for units 
unaffordable to low-income renters. Regulation variables have 
no effect on the relative probability that one of these will leave 
the stock. However, the new-construction-supply elasticity 
does matter. Higher end rental units are less likely to become 
owner-occupied and less likely to be demolished or converted 
when the supply response to a given demand shock is greater. 
This is consistent with the spirit of the filtering model, 
particularly if we think of the purchase of an existing rental unit 
and its conversion to an owner-occupied unit and the 
redevelopment of an existing structure as inferior to new 
greenfield development.
Table 4
Percentage Change in Relative Probabilities
10 Percent Change in Mean Values
























Adequacy of unit 2.28 NS -5.26 NS NS -7.36
Age of unit -5.03 -6.38 8.35 1.90 NS 9.63
Unit is part of multiunit building 1.24 -10.82 -2.37 -2.91 -14.55 -5.46
Number of units in building -0.68 NS NS 0.26 NS NS
Ratio of subsidized units to all units in zone NS NS NS 2.32 NS NS
Average age of rental units in zone NS 5.98 -10.38 1.00 NS -7.66
Ratio of public housing units to rental units in zone NS NS NS 0.25 0.37 NS
Ratio of rental units to all units in zone 6.89 NS NS -1.22 -1.97 NS
Ratio of affordable units to rental units in zone -4.62 NS NS 0.89 1.48 1.03
Percentage African-American heads of household in zone -0.96 -2.17 NS 0.45 -0.80 0.94
Median income in zone 0.00 0.00 NS -24.16 NS -24.16
Hedonic price change in MSA (affordable units) 0.13 NS NS 0.35 NS NS
Hedonic rent change in MSA (affordable units) 4.89 2.64 NS -39.01 13.62 -26.17
Number of years current resident has occupied unit -0.90 — -1.10 0.17 0.28 -0.54
Ratio of rent to cutoff of affordability 5.29 NS -6.27 0.00 0.00 0.00
Notes: The table reports changes in the odds ratios due to a 10 percent increase from the mean and due to an increase equal to one standard deviation from 
the mean. The odds ratios are relative to the outcome with the unit remaining affordable or becoming subsidized. The metropolitan statistical area (MSA) 
dummies are used in specification 1 but are not reported. NS indicates that the variable was not significant at the 5 percent level; the dash indicates that the 
variable was not used in this specification.52 Government Regulation and Changes
Table 7 presents the effects of rent control. Our prior is that 
in a rent-controlled environment, uncontrolled units are more 
likely to filter up. Early and Phelps (1999) and Fallis and Smith 
(1984) demonstrate that rent control increases the rents for 
uncontrolled rental units. However, we find that an 
uncontrolled unit in an area with more rent control is less likely 
to filter up or become owner-occupied and more likely, though 
the effect is not statistically different from zero, to be 
demolished or converted. In trying to explain this outcome, the 
other results do shed some light on the apparent paradox. 
Although not robust in significance, as the percentage of rental 
units subject to rent control in an area rises, uncontrolled units 
are less likely to convert to ownership, relative to remaining 
affordable, and more likely to be demolished or converted. 
Given that rents for uncontrolled units will be higher, and that 
rent control is typically imposed in locations where rents are 
high and rising, this suggests two possible explanations. First, 
uncontrolled units that remain affordable in the presence of 
rent control are more likely to be very low-quality units, 
suggesting selection bias. Despite the presence of rent control, 
the quality of these units indicates that they are less appealing 
for owner-occupants, unable to filter up, and more likely to be 
Table 5




Variable 1 2 3
Filters up
New single-family permits—
  supply elasticity -1.19* -0.53 -1.23**
Jurisdictions in MSA use impact fees
  (dummy) 0.92***
Number of approaches to growth
  management 0.33*
Converts to owner-occupied
New single-family permits—
  supply elasticity 1.46 1.55 1.40
Jurisdictions in MSA use impact fees
  (dummy) 0.15
Number of approaches to growth
  management -0.28
Demolished or converted
New single-family permits—
  supply elasticity 0.83 1.20 0.80
Jurisdictions in MSA use impact fees
  (dummy) 0.50
Number of approaches to growth
  management -0.34
Notes: The table reports the percentage change in the odds ratios due to a 
10 percent increase from the mean. The odds ratios are relative to the out-
come with the unit remaining affordable or becoming subsidized. MSA is 
metropolitan statistical area.
***Statistically significant at the 1 percent level.
**Statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
*Statistically significant at the 10 percent level.
Table 6




Variable 1 2 3
Filters down
New single-family permits—
  supply elasticity -0.38 -0.27 -0.38
Jurisdictions in MSA use
  impact fees (dummy) 0.24
Number of approaches to growth
  management 0.10
Converts to owner-occupied
New single-family permits—
  supply elasticity -0.92** -0.88** -0.92**
Jurisdictions in MSA use impact
  fees (dummy) 0.09
Number of approaches to growth
  management 0.00
Demolished or converted
New single-family permits—
  supply elasticity -1.25 -1.48* -1.26*
Jurisdictions in MSA use impact
  fees (dummy) -0.58
Number of approaches to growth
  management -0.18
Notes: The table reports the percentage change in the odds ratios due to a 
10 percent increase from the mean. The odds ratios are relative to the out-
come with the unit remaining affordable or becoming subsidized. MSA is 
metropolitan statistical area.
***Statistically significant at the 1 percent level.
**Statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
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demolished. Second, if there are strong negative neighborhood 
externalities from being in an area with an undermaintained 
rent-controlled stock, this might reduce the returns to 
maintenance and renovation on uncontrolled units. Even 
though there is an incentive for the rents to rise, this second 
effect would work in the opposite direction. Both of these 
approaches allow for uncontrolled rents to be higher, while the 
returns to maintenance, for filtering up, to be lower. We are 
reluctant without a better sense of the data to reach any strong 
conclusion from this result, and we caution readers to use 
discretion when interpreting it.
6.C o n c l u s i o n
This paper takes a new approach to studying the effects of land-
use regulation. Instead of focusing on the effects of supply 
restrictions, both explicit and implicit, on new construction, 
we examine how they affect the filtering process. This allows us 
to examine the dynamics of the relationship between housing 
affordable to low-income households and local-government-
imposed land-use regulations. Our approach, which borrows 
from Somerville and Holmes (2001), looks at how regulation 
affects the probability that a rental unit currently deemed 
affordable will become unaffordable, owner-occupied, or 
demolished, relative to staying affordable.
We find that regulation does matter: when new 
construction is more constrained, as measured either by a 
lower supply elasticity or the presence of certain regulations, 
affordable units are more likely to filter up and become 
unaffordable, relative to remaining in the affordable stock. We 
find this result to be quite compelling and to offer an important 
lesson for policymakers. The effects of land-use regulation are 
not limited to raising the price of owner-occupied housing and 
reducing access to homeownership. They also have a clear 
negative impact on the most vulnerable. Given the ample 
efforts to document the difficult and worsening affordability 
crisis for the least well-off, this has to be a concern.
There are a number of aspects of this paper that should 
caution against using this work to predict the effects of any new 
policies on the affordable stock. We examine the dynamics of 
the stock, but our supply control variables are MSA-specific 
and time-invariant. Consequently, we know little of the timing 
of these processes. Given the long-run nature of the filtering 
process, this suggests that the outcome of short-run changes in 
policy would be hard to predict. Still, through our examination 
of changes in the stock of affordable units across MSAs—rather 
than the size of the MSA stock itself—we are able to avoid some 
of the more egregious problems of MSA-level, excluded-
variable bias.
Table 7







Percentage of units in zone that are
  rent-controlled is greater than 10 percent -3.65***
Percentage of units in zone that are
  rent-controlled -2.18*
Converts to owner-occupied
Percentage of units in zone that are
  rent-controlled is greater than 10 percent -4.99*
Percentage of units in zone that are
  rent-controlled -5.25
Demolished or converted
Percentage of units in zone that are
  rent-controlled is greater than 10 percent 0.32
Percentage of units in zone that are
  rent-controlled 1.02
Notes: All regressions have metropolitan statistical area (MSA) fixed 
effects and a dummy if the unit is in the MSA’s central city. The table 
reports the percentage change in the odds ratios due to a 10 percent 
increase from the mean. The odds ratios are relative to the outcome 
with the unit remaining affordable or becoming subsidized. 
***Statistically significant at the 1 percent level.
**Statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
*Statistically significant at the 10 percent level.54 Government Regulation and Changes
Table A1
Affordable Rental Units
Multinomial Logit/Excluded Option/Remain Affordable
Specification 1
Pseudo R2 = 7.94 Percent
Specification 2
Pseudo R2 = 8.01 Percent
Specification 3




















Adequacy of unit 1.4121 1.2719 0.5504 1.4045 1.2731 0.5488 1.4134 1.2773 0.5507
  (1 if adequate, 0 otherwise) (4.26) (1.54) (5.38) (4.19) (1.54) (5.40) (4.27) (1.56) (5.37)
Average resident’s evaluation of unit 0.9936 1.0340 0.8649 0.9945 1.0341 0.8652 0.9940 1.0334 0.8643
  (scale of 1-10: 1 is worst, 10 is best) (0.48) (1.28) (7.21) (0.41) (1.28) (7.20) (0.46) (1.26) (7.24)
Age of unit  0.9899 0.9856 1.0198 0.9900 0.9856 1.0198 0.9899 0.9857 1.0200
(5.16) (3.92) (5.70) (5.09) (3.91) (5.71) (5.17) (3.89) (5.74)
Unit is part of multiunit building 1.1901 0.2005 0.7236 1.1924 0.2006 0.7245 1.1894 0.2006 0.7245
   (1 if yes, 0 if no) (2.40) (11.80) (2.79) (2.42) (11.80) (2.78) (2.39) (11.80) (2.78)
Number of units in building 0.9930 0.9902 0.9975 0.9927 0.9902 0.9973 0.9929 0.9903 0.9977
(3.93) (1.78) (0.73) (4.06) (1.78) (0.78) (3.96) (1.77) (0.66)
Ratio of subsidized units to rental units 1.6727 2.2670 0.4304 1.2908 2.1206 0.3801 1.6012 2.3343 0.4278
    in zone (0.85) (0.72) (0.81) (0.42) (0.65) (0.92) (0.78) (0.74) (0.81)
Average age of rental units in zone 0.9982 1.0118 0.9752 1.0003 1.0121 0.9764 0.9975 1.0121 0.9757
(0.45) (1.49) (3.65) (0.08) (1.50) (3.40) (0.60) (1.52) (3.56)
Ratio of public housing units to rental 0.6161 0.9293 5.2494 0.6336 0.9471 5.5030 0.5255 1.0082 6.0647
  units in zone (0.74) (0.06) (1.73) (0.70) (0.04) (1.78) (0.98) (0.01) (1.86)
Ratio of rental units to all units in zone 4.0005 1.5240 0.8627 3.3228 1.4826 0.7920 3.8044 1.6012 0.8900
(4.96) (0.72) (0.30) (4.20) (0.66) (0.47) (4.76) (0.79) (0.23)
Ratio of affordable units to rental units 0.1852 0.8163 0.6334 0.1771 0.8132 0.6191 0.2046 0.7675 0.5854
  in zone (6.08) (0.39) (1.04) (6.22) (0.40) (1.09) (5.61) (0.50) (1.19)
Average resident’s evaluation 1.0298 1.3643 0.8603 1.0852 1.3724 0.8874 1.0296 1.3590 0.8596
  of neighborhood
  (scale of 1-10: 1 is worst, 10 is best)
(0.41) (2.13) (1.22) (1.11) (2.11) (0.94) (0.41) (2.10) (1.23)
Percentage African-American heads 0.7339 0.4705 0.9249 0.8793 0.4789 1.0162 0.7493 0.4635 0.9080
  of household in zone (2.03) (2.44) (0.31) (0.79) (2.23) (0.06) (1.89) (2.48) (0.38)
Median income in zone 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 (0.79) 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
(3.22) (0.52) (0.20) (0.79) (0.44) (0.02) (3.04) (0.61) (0.27)
Hedonic price change in MSA 0.9855 1.8291 0.8197 (0.79) 1.8519 0.8390 0.9892 1.8245 0.8283
  (affordable units) (0.12) (2.50) (0.87) (0.79) (2.54) (0.77) (0.09) (2.50) (0.83)
Hedonic rent change in MSA 6.6865 2.5710 0.7265 (0.79) 2.6750 0.8462 6.3513 2.6997 0.7892
  (affordable units) (5.16) (1.36) (0.56) (0.79) (1.36) (0.28) (4.99) (1.42) (0.41)
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Table A1 (continued)
Affordable Rental Units
Multinomial Logit/Excluded Option/Remain Affordable
Specification 1
Pseudo R2 = 7.94 Percent
Specification 2
Pseudo R2 = 8.01 Percent
Specification 3




















New single-family permits— 0.9925 1.0091 1.0052 (0.79) 1.0097 1.0075 0.9923 1.0087 1.0050
  supply elasticity (1.96) (1.23) (0.78) (0.79) (1.23) (1.06) (2.01) (1.19) (0.76)
Jurisdictions in MSA use impact fees (0.79) 1.0421 1.1484
  (dummy) (0.79) (0.26) (1.00)
Number of approaches to growth 1.0623 0.9490 0.9395
  management (1.69) (0.71) (0.97)
Number of years current resident 0.9877 1.0044 0.9823 0.9876 1.0043 0.9823 0.9874 1.0047 0.9826
  has occupied unit (3.23) (0.65) (2.57) (3.26) (0.65) (2.57) (3.30) (0.70) (2.52)
Ratio of rent to cutoff of affordability 2.0477 0.8783 0.3351 2.1028 0.8805 0.3388 2.0585 0.8782 0.3331
(4.16) (0.40) (4.07) (4.31) (0.39) (4.03) (4.19) (0.40) (4.09)
Notes: Number of observations: 6,168. The dependent variable has four possible values: 1) an affordable rental unit can remain affordable, 2) become unaf-
fordable because of increases in its rent relative to the affordability cutoff, 3) become owner-occupied, or 4) be demolished or converted to another use. The 
excluded (base) outcome is to remain affordable. The top number reported is the unit odds ratio  ; the bottom number (in parentheses) is the Z-statistic. 
The odds ratio is the probability of outcome i divided by the probability of the null (or excluded) outcome, and is equal to  . The unit odds ratio is the 
odds ratio for a one-unit increase to the independent variable. Thus, it is not b that is reported in the table, but eb. The Z-statistic is based on the null
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Table A2
Unaffordable Rental Units
Multinomial Logit/Excluded Option/Remain Unaffordable
Specification 1
Pseudo R2 = 14.58 Percent
Specification 2
Pseudo R2 = 14.59 Percent
Specification 3




















Adequacy of unit 0.8675 1.0149 0.4966 0.8685 1.0153 0.4953 0.8680 1.0150 0.4966
  (1 if adequate, 0 otherwise) (2.93) (0.19) (7.11) (2.91) (0.19) (7.13) (2.92) (0.19) (7.11)
Average resident’s evaluation 1.0016 1.0284 0.9096 1.0018 1.0285 0.9092 1.0017 1.0284 0.9094
  of unit (scale of 1-10:
  1 is worst, 10 is best)
(0.22) (2.71) (5.48) (0.25) (2.71) (5.51) (0.24) (2.70) (5.50)
Age of unit  1.0082 1.0021 1.0336 1.0082 1.0021 1.0336 1.0082 1.0021 1.0337
(8.58) (1.66) (13.61) (8.59) (1.65) (13.60) (8.59) (1.66) (13.61)
Unit is part of multiunit 0.6930 0.1333 0.4521 0.6931 0.1333 0.4516 0.6932 0.1333 0.4517
  building (1 if yes, 0 if no) (10.14) (43.85) (9.27) (10.14) (43.84) (9.29) (10.14) (43.85) (9.28)
Number of units in building 1.0016 0.9991 1.0007 1.0016 0.9991 1.0007 1.0016 0.9991 1.0007
(2.74) (0.94) (0.35) (2.74) (0.95) (0.37) (2.75) (0.94) (0.35)
Ratio of subsidized units 8.0568 0.6546 0.2030 7.7836 0.6535 0.2141 7.9195 0.6545 0.2078
  to rental units in zone (7.44) (1.08) (1.94) (7.29) (1.08) (1.87) (7.36) (1.08) (1.90)
Average age of rental units 1.0032 1.0028 0.9732 1.0036 1.0029 0.9720 1.0031 1.0028 0.9734
  in zone (1.64) (1.05) (5.34) (1.83) (1.09) (5.48) (1.57) (1.05) (5.29)
Ratio of public housing units 1.3729 1.2864 0.0738 1.3555 1.2731 0.0734 1.3328 1.2862 0.0777
  to rental units in zone (0.88) (0.43) (2.73) (0.84) (0.41) (2.73) (0.79) (0.43) (2.66)
Ratio of rental units to all units 0.6826 0.4465 0.8638 0.6644 0.4429 0.9040 0.6763 0.4465 0.8693
  in zone (2.79) (4.06) (0.41) (2.95) (4.08) (0.28) (2.85) (4.06) (0.39)
Ratio of affordable units 2.6278 4.1712 3.7485 2.5791 4.1394 3.9768 2.6867 4.1674 3.5933
  to rental units in zone (5.88) (5.47) (3.15) (5.74) (5.43) (3.27) (5.93) (5.39) (3.00)
Average resident’s evaluation 1.0327 0.9513 0.9293 1.0430 0.9561 0.9040 1.0344 0.9511 0.9267
  of neighborhood (scale of
  1-10: 1 is worst, 10 is best)
(0.89) (0.95) (0.77) (1.14) (0.83) (1.03) (0.93) (0.95) (0.80)
Percentage African-American 1.4736 0.5119 1.8318 1.5326 0.5225 1.6618 1.4840 0.5118 1.8133
  heads of household in zone (4.54) (4.18) (2.84) (4.70) (3.86) (2.22) (4.60) (4.15) (2.79)
Median income in zone 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
(6.80) (1.31) (4.44) (6.92) (1.36) (4.24) (6.84) (1.31) (4.41)
Hedonic price change in MSA 1.3389 1.1121 1.0197 1.3478 1.1140 1.0070 1.3404 1.1122 1.0225
  (affordable units) (4.94) (1.37) (0.12) (5.04) (1.39) (0.04) (4.95) (1.37) (0.14)
Hedonic rent change in MSA 0.1328 1.8894 0.3134 0.1379 1.9044 0.2891 0.1305 1.8912 0.3240
  (affordable units) (13.40) (3.24) (3.10) (12.90) (3.26) (3.26) (13.38) (3.19) (2.98)
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Table A2 (Continued)
Unaffordable Rental Units
Multinomial Logit/Excluded Option/Remain Unaffordable
Specification 1
Pseudo R2 = 14.58 Percent
Specification 2
Pseudo R2 = 14.59 Percent
Specification 3




















New single-family permits— 0.9973 0.9936 0.9913 0.9981 0.9939 0.9897 0.9974 0.9936 0.9912
  supply elasticity (1.37) (2.32) (1.64) (0.92) (2.11) (1.89) (1.33) (2.32) (1.66)
Jurisdictions in MSA use 1.0474 1.0184 0.8917
  impact fees (dummy) (1.26) (0.39) (1.23)
Number of approaches to 1.0141 0.9996 0.9743
  growth management (0.84) (0.02) (0.58)
Number of years current 1.0105 1.0162 0.9610 1.0104 1.0161 0.9612 1.0104 1.0162 0.9612
  resident has occupied unit (3.92) (4.04) (3.89) (3.88) (4.03) (3.88) (3.89) (4.04) (3.87)
Ratio of rent to cutoff 0.1101 1.9436 0.5795 0.1100 1.9413 0.5827 0.1099 1.9438 0.5829
  of affordability (45.98) (15.53) (5.07) (45.99) (15.46) (5.01) (45.95) (15.43) (4.99)
Notes: Number of observations: 48,347. The dependent variable has four possible values: 1) an unaffordable rental unit can remain unaffordable, 2) become 
affordable because of decreases in its rent relative to the affordability cutoff, 3) become owner-occupied, or 4) be demolished or converted to another use. 
The excluded (base) outcome is to remain unaffordable. The top number reported is the unit odds ratio  ; the bottom number (in parentheses) is the 
Z-statistic. The odds ratio is the probability of outcome i divided by the probability of the null (or excluded) outcome, and is equal to  . The unit odds 
ratio is the odds ratio for a one-unit increase to the independent variable. Thus, it is not b that is reported in the table, but eb. The Z-statistic is based on the 
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Table A3
Affordable Rental Units
Multinomial Logit/Excluded Option/Remain Affordable
Specification 1
Pseudo R2 = 10.79 Percent
Specification 2










Adequacy of unit (1 if adequate, 0 otherwise) 2.1860 1.2212 0.4240 2.0122 1.0494 0.4315
(2.74) (0.29) (1.74) (2.47) (0.07) (1.71)
Average resident’s evaluation of unit 0.9240 1.1128 0.9087 0.9282 1.1147 0.9095
  (scale of 1-10: 1 is worst, 10 is best) (1.86) (0.95) (1.12) (1.77) (0.97) (1.11)
Age of unit  0.9976 0.9697 1.0114 0.9973 0.9698 1.0117
(0.37) (2.11) (0.84) (0.41) (2.10) (0.86)
Unit is part of multiunit building (1 if yes, 0 if no) 1.7279 0.1558 0.2353 1.6745 0.1617 0.2357
(2.19) (3.03) (2.77) (2.09) (3.02) (2.75)
Number of units in building 0.9911 0.9973 0.9954 0.9915 0.9968 0.9950
(1.77) (0.33) (0.42) (1.72) (0.39) (0.45)
Ratio of subsidized units to rental units in zone 0.7921 0.0002 0.2915 0.4865 0.0001 0.2465
(0.13) (2.05) (0.28) (0.41) (2.20) (0.32)
Average age of rental units in zone 0.9698 0.9700 0.9290 0.9735 0.9829 0.9262
(1.66) (0.67) (1.76) (1.42) (0.36) (1.78)
Ratio of public housing units to rental units in zone 0.0040 0.0318 0.1173 0.0122 0.0915 0.0888
(2.39) (0.73) (0.43) (1.97) (0.53) (0.50)
Ratio of rental units to all units in zone 0.7950 4.9530 104.5796 0.9647 8.5545 77.8929
(0.23) (0.71) (1.99) (0.03) (0.92) (1.83)
Ratio of affordable units to rental units in zone 0.7486 11.9466 1.9007 0.5920 13.4601 1.9701
(0.25) (0.81) (0.23) (0.45) (0.84) (0.24)
Average resident’s evaluation of neighborhood 1.1137 1.2297 1.1343 1.1639 1.4238 1.0564
  (scale of 1-10: 1 is worst, 10 is best) (0.49) (0.43) (0.27) (0.66) (0.69) (0.11)
Percentage African-American heads of household in zone 0.4929 0.0373 0.2794 0.4870 0.0352 0.2909
(1.11) (1.82) (0.88) (1.12) (1.79) (0.87)
Median income in zone 0.9999 0.9999 1.0000 0.9999 0.9999 1.0000
(2.63) (1.49) (0.21) (2.46) (1.33) (0.22)
Hedonic price change in MSA (affordable units) 0.7749 0.2247 5.0766 0.7991 0.2322 4.9279
(0.43) (1.07) (0.98) (0.38) (1.05) (0.96)
Hedonic rent change in MSA (affordable units) 0.0368 0.0000 0.0000 0.2773 0.0000 0.0000
(0.51) (1.23) (0.93) (0.20) (0.99) (0.96)
Dummy variable = 1 if percentage of units in zone  0.4516 0.3349 1.0714
  that are rent-controlled is greater than 10 percent (3.04) (1.85) (0.12)
Percentage of units in zone that are rent-controlled 0.2057 0.0210 2.0694
(1.66) (1.62) (0.35)
Dummy variable = 1 if zone is in central city 1.4884 2.7934 1.3968 1.2578 2.5738 1.3405
(1.33) (1.50) (0.50) (0.78) (1.39) (0.45)
Dummy variable = 1 for Washington, D.C. 0.4480 0.0682 0.1614 0.5596 0.1001 0.1613
(0.68) (0.99) (0.87) (0.50) (0.84) (0.87)
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Table A3 (Continued)
Affordable Rental Units
Multinomial Logit/Excluded Option/Remain Affordable
Specification 1
Pseudo R2 = 10.79 Percent
Specification 2










Dummy variable = 1 for New York City 0.6799 0.5997 0.6003 0.6866 0.4254 0.7762
(0.55) (0.32) (0.37) (0.52) (0.52) (0.17)
Dummy variable = 1 for San Francisco 0.4021 0.0914 0.2025 0.4563 0.1195 0.1935
(0.97) (1.10) (0.94) (0.84) (0.96) (0.97)
Dummy variable = 1 for San Jose 0.3275 0.1017 0.2308 0.4102 0.1489 0.2342
(1.26) (1.04) (0.88) (1.00) (0.86) (0.87)
Dummy variable = 1 for Boston 1.2361 5.1691 3.2279 1.2339 3.4391 4.1158
(0.34) (1.14) (0.88) (0.32) (0.83) (0.94)
Number of years current resident has occupied unit 0.9990 0.9866 1.0083 0.9982 0.9859 1.0080
(0.11) (0.55) (0.39) (0.19) (0.58) (0.38)
Ratio of rent to cutoff of affordability 0.6567 1.0654 1.1459 0.6721 1.1626 1.0885
(0.90) (0.06) (0.13) (0.85) (0.14) (0.08)
Notes: Number of observations: 592. The dependent variable has four possible values: 1) an affordable rental unit can remain affordable, 2) become unafford-
able because of increases in its rent relative to the affordability cutoff, 3) become owner-occupied, or 4) be demolished or converted to another use. The 
excluded (base) outcome is to remain affordable. The top number reported is the unit odds ratio  ; the bottom number (in parentheses) is the Z-statistic. 
The odds ratio is the probability of outcome i divided by the probability of the null (or excluded) outcome, and is equal to  . The unit odds ratio is the 
odds ratio for a one-unit increase to the independent variable. Thus, it is not b that is reported in the table, but eb. The Z-statistic is based on the null 
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1. Among the many papers in this literature are Bogdon, Silver, and 
Turner (1994) on the relationship between affordability and 
adequacy, Nelson (1994) on the association between the affordable 
stock and low-income households, O’Flaherty (1996) on the 
economics of homelessness, and especially Nelson and 
Vandenbroucke’s (1996) seminal work charting the size of and change 
in the aggregate low-income housing stock.
2. The older empirical treatments of filtering are well surveyed by 
Brzeski (1977). Arnott, Davidson, and Pines (1983) allow for 
maintenance and rehabilitation, and Braid (1981) studies filtering in 
rental housing markets. Among a number of their papers on this topic, 
Bond and Coulson (1989) analyze neighborhood change in a model 
where the value of housing is related to neighborhood characteristics.
3. Mayer and Somerville (2000b) formally test the effects of regulation 
on the dynamics of the supply response to demand shocks.
4. An exception is Arnott (1995), who identifies several potential 
welfare benefits of rent control.
5. DiPasquale and Somerville (1995) demonstrate how to merge the 
1974-83 AHS data with those from 1984-94, but the earlier period 
does not report precise rents. Combining the two sets would bias our 
results because we must set a precise cutoff for affordability.
6. Rents are a percentage of the four-person family, 30 percent cutoff 
as follows: zero bedrooms, 70 percent; one bedroom, 75 percent; two 
bedrooms, 90 percent; three bedrooms, 104 percent; four bedrooms, 
116 percent; then increasing by 12 percentage points for each 
additional bedroom up to fourteen bedrooms.
7. In 1989, the survey question about utility costs was changed, 
resulting in a shift in responses. To correct for this change, we follow 
Nelson and Vandenbroucke (1996) and adjust reported utility costs 
for 1989 and later years.
8. The category “demolished or converted” includes units that were 
converted to business use, eliminated in a conversion, abandoned, 
destroyed by disaster, demolished, or condemned. It also includes 
units with an interior now exposed to the elements and mobile-home 
sites that no longer have a home on them.
9. We expect that a new occupant is less likely to respond to the AHS 
than an occupant who has responded in the past. Rents for a unit tend 
to increase more with unit turnover. Thus, we are likely to undercount 
units whose rents rise, resulting in an undercount of those units that 
move out of the affordable stock because the new rent exceeds the 
affordability cutoff.References
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